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RESPONDING TO BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS
BY BARRY KELLMAN*
In 2001, powdered anthrax in envelopes disrupted the government, cost billions to clean
up, and killed five people.1 Terrorist groups such as Aum Shunriky, which released sarin gas in
the Tokyo subway experimented with biological weapons. 2 Al Qaida built an anthrax lab in
Afghanistan in the 1990s. 3 Experts are concerned that future bio-attacks could lead to dire
consequences substantially exceeding anything other than nuclear weapons – hundreds of
thousands of casualties, trillions of dollars in losses, and exceptional levels of panic.4 In 2008, the
Commission on Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism asserted
that bio-attacks are the most likely catastrophic threat to humanity.5
How should the government be ready to respond to a catastrophic bio-attack that no one
knows when, where, or even whether it will occur? It is useful to break down this question into
three principle components. First, how can responders quickly and accurately know what agent
has been used so that they can respond? Second, how can responders obtain sufficient medication
to treat affected populations against whichever agent that has been used? Third, how can
responders effectively limit the damage and restore order? Dozens of U.S. government agencies
and programs have relevant and often overlapping responsibilities without centralized oversight
– a bureaucratic condition that makes it difficult for people inside and outside government to
understand what is exactly going on.6
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I. Detection and Diagnosis
Each specific bio-agent demands a unique response. Properly responding to an anthrax
attack, for instance, is very different than responding to a smallpox or plague attack.7 Moreover,
decisions must be made quickly to stanch a pandemic’s spread. Being able to accurately and
quickly detect and diagnose a bio-attack depends on having sophisticated capacities in place to
gather, transmit, and analyze health and environmental data.
Detection
The earlier that a bio-attack is detected, the better. Yet, unlike an explosion or other
conventional attack, a bio-attack will not be immediately obvious until disease symptoms are
overwhelming. Even then, there will likely be confusion about which disease is causing those
symptoms. The challenge, therefore, is obtaining accurate data quickly enough to mobilize an
effective response.
1.

BioWatch for Sensing Pathogens

Experts believe that bio-attack agents will likely be released in the air within highly
trafficked indoor sites such as arenas, airports, and subway stations.8 Programs managed by the
Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services are responsible for detection
of a bio-attack.9 To detect unusual releases, the DHS Office of Health Affairs BioWatch program
places biosensors in major American cities that are connected to a national 24/7 early warning
system.10 Although DHS has not confirmed the exact number of cities engaged in the BioWatch
program or the exact location of sensors, at least 31 cities are included in the BioWatch program,
including Philadelphia, New York City, Washington, San Diego, Boston, Chicago, Miami, Atlanta,
Detroit, Denver, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, Houston and Los Angeles, with a goal of
expanding to as many as 120 cities.11
The sensors test for anthrax, smallpox, plague, tularemia, and perhaps other agents,
although the exact list is undisclosed.12 Despite the biosensors, testing for bio-agents in the air is
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extremely difficult.13 A sensor that is too specific might neglect a dangerous release.14 A sensor
that is too broad, on the other hand, it might falsely react to something natural and benign.15 DHS
officials, therefore, are continuously trying to improve sensor capabilities.16
2. Programs for Reporting Unusual Diseases

Other than sensing pathogens, a bio-attack can be detected through reports of unusual
disease outbreaks.17 By accumulating reports of often-disparate symptoms, public health officials
can identify a pattern that might suggest an epidemic.18 Biosurveillance refers to a continuous
process for monitoring the environment for markers of disease.19 The key to biosurveillance is the
systematic collection and analysis of data that can usefully characterize an event, as well as support
an outbreak investigation.20 The 2009 swine flu outbreak, for example, was initially signaled by a
sudden increase in worker and student absenteeism in Veracruz, Mexico, along with elevated
purchases of over-the-counter flu remedies. 21 In 2007, the 9/11 Commission Act required the
development of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (“NBIC”) to identify,
characterize, localize and track biological events. 22 The Health Incident Surveillance Branch
within the Health Threats Resilience Division of the DHS-OHA supervises the NBIC in
coordination with 14 federal agencies.23
The BioSense program is another important component of biosurveillance. BioSense was
initiated in 2003 as an integrated public health surveillance program managed by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).24 Patient-anonymous data is collected from electronic
13
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health record systems, school absentee data, pharmacy data, food-borne outbreaks and other
information sources for syndromic analysis.25 State and local public health authorities have access
to this secure data to aid in analysis; public health authorities may now designate BioSense for
receiving syndromic surveillance test messages.26
The CDC, in turn, promotes disease reporting through the Public Health Information
Network (“PHIN”), a network of information systems that optimizes electronic disease reporting
with a common lexicon and technical requirements, and by promulgating an overall health
information exchange architecture.27 The National Electronic Disease Surveillance System is an
Internet-based exchange architecture designed to enhance the PHIN by transferring appropriate
public health, laboratory and clinical data efficiently and securely over the Internet to public health
departments. 28 Notably, increased resources are being devoted to standards-based electronic
messaging between stakeholders at multiple levels (providers, labs, local and state public health
and CDC). 29
The CDC's BioIntelligence Center (“BIC”) provides situational awareness of potential
threats to local and state governments.30 BIC analysts examine health data regarding 11 outbreak
syndromes such as fever, rash, and gastrointestinal distress in order to detect unusual
concentrations that might indicate a significant threat to public health.31 When appropriate, the
CDC director's Emergency Operations Center monitors the situation and coordinates data and
analysis with the BIC. 32 The CDC also works to identify outbreaks with local and international
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partners. 33 The CDC Center for Global Health maintains regular relationships with the World
Health Organization and numerous other national health departments and ministries.34
Diagnosis
Whether natural or intentional, it is imperative to accurately diagnose a pandemic’s cause
in order to dispense effective countermeasures, to track its origin and spread, and to investigate
potential perpetrators. Diagnosis of pathogens are coordinated by the CDC through the national
Laboratory Response Network (“LRN”).35 The LRN is a nationwide network composed primarily
of local, state, and federal government laboratories that provide confirmatory testing of potential
bioterrorism pathogens in all 50 state public health labs and in additional locations.36 Consensus
protocols for testing were developed by the CDC, the FBI, and the Association of Public Health
Laboratories prior to the anthrax mailings of 2001.37
In addition, the National Bioforensics Analysis Center (“NBFAC”), part of the National
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center operated by the DHS in partnership with the
FBI, is a central facility for analyzing biological samples in order to identify and attribute the use
of biological weapons. 38 NBFAC has implemented a multi-faceted research and development
program, established a stand-alone Safety and Biosecurity Program, Quality/Accreditation
Program, and received select agent-handling certification from the CDC for all laboratory staff
and facilities.39 The NBFAC has also established a National Bioforensic Repository Collection
with a comprehensive management plan and acquisition strategy to provide reference
microbiological material against which suspect samples can be compared. 40
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Public Health in the Time of Bioterrorism, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1015, 1015 (2002).
37 HOLLY HARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31719, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM
IN THE CONTEXT OF BIOTERRORISM (2003).
38 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center,
http://www.dhs.gov/files/labs/gc_1166211221830.shtm (last visited Jan. 17, 2019); See Vitko Jr., John,
Director of Department of Homeland Security, National Biodefense Strategy, Congressional Testimony (July
28, 2005).
39
Joseph I. Lieberman et al., A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to
Optimize Efforts, BIPARTISAN REP. OF THE BLUE RIBBON STUDY PANEL ON BIODEFENSE 4, 9 (Oct. 2015),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283295565_A_National_Blueprint_For_Biodefense_Leadership_An
d_Major_Reform_Needed_To_Optimize_Efforts.
40 See Implementing the National Defense Strategy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Preventions of Nuclear
Biological Attack of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. (2005).
33

5

II. Medical Countermeasures
Unlike most other disasters that require generic treatment of injuries due to blast and fire,
treating victims of bio-attacks requires rapid and targeted application of specific medical
countermeasures (“MCM”) such as vaccines and antidotes. 41 Doing this effectively poses two
challenges:
1. Many MCMs need to be developed or improved, entailing substantial research and
testing;
2. MCMs need to be securely stockpiled, distributed to attack sites, and disseminated to
victims under conditions of extreme stress.
MCM Development
Producing MCMs against bio-attacks brings several risks. Developing MCMs against
many different pathogens is scientifically challenging; the market for useful products is extremely
uncertain; and large research and development investments might never bring a fair return. 42
Project BioShield, the comprehensive system for MCM preparedness, is organized around three
main aspects:
1. Funding and procurement;
2. Facilitation of R&D; and
3. Facilitation of countermeasure use in an emergency.43
A complex bureaucracy, administered by HHS through the office of the assistant secretary
for preparedness and response (“ASPR”) is responsible for incentivizing MCM preparedness.44
The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (“NIAID”) have primary responsibility to see that promising drug candidates are awarded
contracts through Project BioShield’s funds.45 The Institutes’ approach is known as the “push”

41
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incentive because it tries to set in motion the wheels of research and expedite reviews of promising
biodefense drugs through the application process.46
Within ASPR, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
(“BARDA”) oversees and coordinates the research and acquisition of MCMs and is primarily
responsible for facilitating communication between the federal government and the biomedical
industry.47 For MCMs at an advanced level of development, the BioShield Special Reserve Fund
enables BARDA to purchase and stockpile MCMs while simultaneously providing funding for
their research and development, as well as providing the manufacturer with a guaranteed purchaser
— the United States government.48 The Medical Countermeasure Development Fund, separate and
in addition to the BioShield Special Reserve Fund, allows BARDA authorities to sponsor
innovative research to improve MCMs.49
When a promising MCM is developed, the Public Health Emergency Medical
Countermeasures Enterprise (“PHEMCE”), overseen by BARDA as a multi-agency collaborative
“entreprise”, determines its requirements and prioritizes development and acquisition programs.50
Through the use of milestone contracts that allow companies to receive payments prior to final
delivery of the goods, BARDA/PHEMCE can review the progress and determine whether the work
is satisfactory so that promising drugs may be appropriately transitioned for additional funding.51
The Department of Defense has complementary programs: the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency’s Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative program seeks to develop broadspectrum defenses against bacterial pathogens and hemorrhagic fevers; the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency’s Accelerated Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals program is authorized

ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASE, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/nih-almanac/national-instituteallergy-infectious-diseases-niaid (last updated Mar. 1, 2017).
46 THERESA WIZEMANN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD.S’, THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES ENTERPRISE: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE PRODUCTS FROM
DISCOVERY THROUGH APPROVAL: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 39-40, 124, 142 (2010).
47
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., BARDA Strategic Plan 2011-2016, BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RES. &
DEV. AUTH. 4 (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.phe.gov/about/barda/Documents/barda-strategic-plan.pdf.
48 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., Project Bioshield Overview,
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/barda/cbrn/project-bioshield-overview.aspx (last visited May 15,
2019).
49 Id.
50
Barry Kellman & Zachary D. Clopton, A Global Architecture for Medical Counter-Measure Preparedness
Against Bioviolence, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 550, 556 (2009); See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV.,
Implementation Plan for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats, HHS PUB. HEALTH EMER.
MED. COUNTERMEASURE ENTER. 5-6 (Apr. 2007),
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Documents/2007-phemce-implementation.pdf.
51 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., Project Bioshield Funding,
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/barda/cbrn/project-bioshield-overview/project-bioshieldfunding.aspx (last visited May 15, 2019).
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to create a system for producing 3 million doses of vaccines or monoclonal antibodies within
twelve (12) weeks.52
While Project BioShield was initially funded with $5.6 billion, some of that funding has
since been transferred to basic research and development of antiviral medications against the flu.53
One reason for these transfers is that BioShield has had very limited success, generating only a
handful of useful MCMs.54 Most experts give BioShield credit for alleviating some bureaucratic
and financial impediments to developing MCMs and attribute its lack of success to the scientific
complexity of discovering safe and effective medicines against threatening scourges.55
New Vaccine Production Capacities
The government’s efforts to increase medical countermeasures’ production have had some
success. A recently opened vaccine production facility in North Carolina is owned and managed
by Novartis; the Department of Health and Human Services contributed 49 percent toward the
facility’s total investment of nearly $1 billion. 56 The facility produces vaccines using cultured
canine kidney cells (instead of the traditional chicken eggs) to grow u vaccine—as much as 50
million doses.57 Use of tissue culture in-stead of eggs reduces the danger of contamination and
increases capacities for rapid mass production of vaccine. 58 The new facility might reduce
production times from five months to four, although there is dispute among experts if the new
facility will in fact reduce production times by that much. 59 There is also some disagreement
about the impact of reduction times, with proponents emphasizing the ability to incorporate new

52

Defense Threat Reduction Agency: Chemical/Biological Technologies, DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY,
http://www.dtra.mil/Research/Chemical-Biological-Technologies/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2019); Gigi Kwik
Gronvall et al., Flexible Defenses Roundtable Meeting: Promoting the Strategic Innovation of Medical
Countermeasures, 5 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 271, 274 (2007).
53 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., Project Bioshield Overview,
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/barda/cbrn/project-bioshield-overview/ (last updated Oct. 18, 2018);
See also FRANK GROTTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41033, PROJECT BIOSHIELD: APPROPRIATIONS,
ACQUISITIONS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2011).
54 NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, Q&A: Bioshield Program Successful After “Rocky Start,” HHS
Preparedness Chief Says, https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/q-bioshield-program-successful-after-rocky-starthhs-preparedness-chief-says/ (last visited May 15, 2019).
55 See Wil S. Hylton, How Ready are we for Bioterrorism?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-for-bioterrorism.html.
56 Robert Roos, Novartis Unveils US Cell-Based Flu Vaccine Plant, U. OF MINN. CTR. FOR
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news
perspective/2009/11/novartis-unveils-us-cell-based-flu-vaccine-plant. See also $486M Novartis Plant Funded,
N.C. BIOTECHNOLOGY CTR. (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.ncbiotech.org/news/486m-novartis-plantfunded.
57 Id. See also Karie Youngdahl, U.S. Cell Line Facility to Produce Pandemic Influenza Vaccine, THE HIST. OF
VACCINES (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/blog/us-cell-line-facility-produce
pandemic influenza-vaccine.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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data about the disease in-to the vaccine.60 Other experts point out that, even at four months, a
sudden and acute pandemic would already be in its second stage. 61
In addition, Medicago, recently opened a new vaccine production facility with a $21 million
contract from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which makes a vaccine from
virus-like particles of certain tobacco leaves. 62 In this process, only 30 days are required to
develop vaccines. 63 This process may also have the advantage of reducing the cost and timing
of vaccine production. 64 In any event, the next stage in vaccine production involves the use of
recombinant technology that is forecast to reduce production times to 12 weeks, though this
capability is at least two years away. 65
Stockpile Planning, Distribution and Dispensation
Surge capacity to produce MSMs does not currently exist when a bio-attack occurs.
Therefore, MCMs must be produced in advance and stored in the Strategic National Stockpile
(“SNS”) – a network of warehouses holding stores of medicines and equipment for distribution
during emergencies. 66 Locations and contents of specific countermeasures are kept secret for
security reasons, but certainly include countermeasures for common bioterrorism threats such as
vaccines for anthrax, smallpox and tularemia.67 Because MCMs must be maintained under strict
temperature and other constraints, elaborate plans for the SNS have been developed by BARDA;
the CDC manages the stockpile with support of BARDA, DHS and United States Department of
Defense (“DoD”).68
When a disease emergency is declared, the affected state’s governor must request delivery
of MCMs, although in cases of national emergency the president can assume this responsibility.69
CDC officials, in coordination with officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) as well as state and local officials, are authorized to evaluate the situation, determine the
60

Id.
See Mitchel L. Zoler, Flu Vaccine Facility May not Speed Production, SKIN & ALLERGY NEWS, Feb. 1,
2012, at 34.
62 Frank Vinluan, Medicago’s RTP Vaccine Facility Opens to Address Pandemics, MEDCITY NEWS (Nov. 14,
2011), http://www.medcitynews.com/2011/11/medicagos-rtp-vaccine-facility-opens-to-address-pandemics/.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Plant-Derived Vaccines, BIOPHARMA DEALMAKERS (Jul. 20, 2018),
https://biopharmadealmakers.nature.com/users/114926-medicago/posts/37798-plant-derived-vaccines.
66 Barry Kellman & Zachary D. Clopton, A Global Architecture for Medical Counter-Measure Preparedness
Against Bioviolence, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 550, 557 (2009).
67 Anthrax, Smallpox, and Bioterrorism, THE VACCINE PAGE, http://vaccines.org/bioterrorism.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2019).
68 James T. Need, Strategic National Stockpile Program: Implications for Military Medicine, 171 MIL. MED.
698, 698 (2006).
69Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing Strategic National Stockpile Assets: Version 11, CTR.S’ FOR
DISEASE CONTROL 30, 72-73, https://www.orau.gov/sns/v11/ReceivingDistributingDispensing
SNSAssets_V11.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
61
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most prudent action, and prioritize MCM dispensation.70 Under current plans, supplies from the
SNS will be distributed to affected areas rapidly through push packages – government-owned
caches of supplies and medications – within twelve (12) hours via either trucks or commercial
cargo aircraft.71 Concurrently, the SNS Program will deploy its Stockpile Service Advance Group
to coordinate with state and local officials so that the SNS assets can be efficiently received and
distributed upon arrival at the site. 72
There is ongoing debate about what is the best method of dispensing MCMs to the public.73
Until relatively recently, plans have called from dispensation from central locations such as schools
and community centers.74 This has the advantage of putting the MCMs into the hands of state and
local health departments who have been trained on the reception, protection and dispensation of
these supplies. There are, however, disadvantages, especially for people with challenged mobility
or living far from urban centers. Moreover, central dispensation assumes that emergency
responders are able to work and that there is a command and control system to effectively guide
the process. In a dire emergency, these assumptions might not be realistic.75
For some MCMs – especially those that can be self-administered – an alternative to
centralized dispensation is to get them to each household, typically through postal delivery. This
is far more convenient for house-bound citizens. Moreover, inducing people to stay in their homes
is important to reduce the spread of contagious disease; it obviously makes sense to avoid having
them come to a central site to get their medicine. However, not all medication can be selfadministered, and effective household delivery does not ensure that the medication will be taken
correctly. While an advance delivery of medicine and substantial information on proper use can
alleviate some of these problems, certain medication has a short shelf life – delivering them in
advance of an emergency might not be effective. Altogether, officials are weighing many different
options, none of which are perfect.
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III. Response and Restoration of Order
In many respects, responses to bio-attacks will be similar to any catastrophe. For example,
as part of the normal National Response Framework, a governor can request the president to
declare a state of emergency, which triggers FEMA’s authority under the Federal Emergency
Response Plan, pursuant to the National Incident Management System, to provide technical and
advisory assistance, funds and supplies. 76 Yet, bio-attacks pose a unique threat that cannot be
adequately addressed with normal emergency declaration processes because of the intensive need
for specialized responses. In connection with bio-attacks, three aspects of consequence mitigation
and order restoration deserve special attention.
Use of Military Forces
Generally, emergency responses do not involve the direct use of military forces because of
restrictions imposed in the Posse Comitatus Act and the Stafford Act. 77 National Guard units,
however, may be used under the direction of their state’s governor because state militias are not
generally bound by the Posse Comitatus Act. 78 In response to bio-attacks, however, the U.S.
attorney general may request assistance from the defense secretary because of the immediate need
for specialized materials and training.79 The U.S. attorney general and the defense secretary must
jointly determine that the biological weapon poses “a serious threat to the interest of the United
States” according to the following three factors:
1. Civilian expertise and capabilities cannot immediately counter the threat;
2. The Defense Department's capabilities are necessary to counter the threat; and,
3. Enforcement of the laws against weapons of mass destruction would be impaired if the
Defense Department was not allowed to act.80
The President also has the authority to use the military in order to alleviate the demands on
local law enforcement in cases of a biological attack.81
Public Health Mobilization
While the CDC has as an essential role in sharing information and providing both resources
and expertise, the primary responsibility of a public health response will rest upon the public health
departments of individual states. These departments, through the governor's authority, can
76
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79
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implement restrictions after an emergency is declared and conduct a large portion of laboratory
testing. Moreover, states’ public health departments will likely coordinate mass casualty treatment
and care.
Local public health departments have a critical role in public messaging, the operation of
local clinics and information sharing among medical institutions. Public messaging will likely
include information on best practices for limiting the spread of disease and other advisories. They
may be the first to identify local public health impacts and have a responsibility to notify state and
federal agencies.82
In the case of a biological attack, the traditional command and control under the National
Incident Management System mentioned earlier will remain in place.83 Public health authorization
is required for movement restrictions at the state level and for stockpile distribution at the federal
level, and offers other protections.84 Because other agencies may not have the same specialized
knowledge about protection from pathogens, treatment protocols or a technical understanding of
disease spread, public health departments are likely to take the lead in response priorities and will
likely encounter great deference.
Restricting Movement
If a contagious agent is used in a bio-attack, the need to stanch the spread of disease may
require a quarantine, restrictions on travel, curfews, the closing of borders, and cancellation of
public gatherings.85 Most states authorize the governor to declare martial law during an emergency
and take personal property, subject to constitutional guarantees of fair compensation.86 Governors
also have broad authority to reallocate the use of publicly owned facilities.87 It may be necessary
for example, to convert public schools into sheltering, triage or command and control centers.
Typically, there is a defined statutory period during which the governor may act in consultation
with the state's public health department but without legislative approval.88
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Although federal authority requires more statutory certainty, various executive authorities
have similarly broad powers in the correct conditions. The Surgeon General may, with the approval
of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, make rules to prevent interstate
and international transmission of disease including issuing orders to apprehend and detain those
believed to be infected by disease.89 This authority does not extend to local quarantines, but the
HHS secretary may cooperate and aid local officials in setting up their quarantines.90
Whenever a restriction such as a quarantine or evacuation is ordered, there will be some
noncompliance. Judgments must be made to determine the amount of force allowed to enforce the
restrictions: the force appropriate for a precautionary quarantine, as supposed to preventing the
spread of a disease that could result in the deaths of hundreds of millions, will be dramatically
different. With the societal stress, traditional crimes like looting and robbery will become more
likely. Responders who must use force are only held liable if their actions constituted unreasonably
excessive force given what the responder was aware of at the time.
IV. Conclusion
Planning bio-attack responses must address the risks that an attacker can cause huge
catastrophe using a variety of attack agents and release methods. Yet, bio-attacks have happened
only once – the 2001 anthrax attacks.91 There is scant evidence on which to predict how a response
to such potentially distinctive high-consequence events will unfold on a large scale. Moreover, the
maze of bureaucratic responsibility for responding to bio-attacks means that no centralized
authority (short of the president) will exercise over-arching command and control. Indeed, federal
responsibilities are spread among various offices in the DHS and HHS, with support from the
attorney general, surgeon general, and Defense Department. 92 However, the response is not
entirely federal and local officials also have critical roles in responses. On top of all this is the
likely unprecedented panic that a bio-attack will provoke. All these factors – lack of experience,
mass consequences and panic, variable conditions and attack modes, and overlapping
responsibilities -- will make it difficult to sort out the facts of a bio-attack. The key to success is
preparation.
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